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STATIONARY SOURCE POLLUTION POLICY
AND CHOICES FOR REFORM
WINSTON HARRINGTON and ALAN J. KRUPNICK*

In response to the alleged adverse effects of regulation, the reconsideration of environmental policies now under way gives far more
prominence to the economic implications of regulatory policies than
has been the case in the past. Adverse economic effects associated
with regulation, however, do not necessarily justify the abandonment
of environmental policy objectives. Rather, these effects may be seen
as emphasizing the importance of seeking alternative approaches.
The environmental policies with the greatest impact on the national
economy are probably those that limit industrial air and water pollution. These policies are now under attack for imposing excessive compliance costs on households, firms, and government and for retarding
innovation and investment. These costs have, in turn, been linked to
excessive reliance on technology-based standards and to cumbersome
and erratic procedures for obtaining permits for construction of new
plant and equipment.
In this paper we briefly discuss the approach to stationary source
air and water pollution that was formulated in the early 1970s and
point out some of its limitations. We next examine some major modifications to this approach put in place in 1977 and discuss in detail
the merits of a number of recent substantive and procedural reforms
and their effects on the economy. Some of these reforms involve
greater use of economic incentives in pollution abatement policy.
TECHNOLOGY-BASED STANDARDS
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) in 1970
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (FWPCA)
in 1972. Although earlier environmental pollution statutes were on
the books,' these two acts represented a fundamental change in the
degree and kind of federal intervention to protect environmental
quality.2
*Winston Harrington and Alan J. Krupnick are fellows in the Quality of the Environment
Division, Resources for the Future.
1. For a discussion of federal pollution legislation prior to 1970, see A. KNEESE & C.
SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 39-50 (1975).
2. Id. at 51. See also A. Freeman, Air and Water PollutionPolicy, in CURRENT ISSUES
IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 12 (P. Portney ed. 1978).
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The most important innovation in these two statutes was their extensive reliance on technology-based emission standards for waste
dischargers. In the technology-based approach, the abatement regulations for an industrial category are determined solely by considering
the abatement technologies available and are applied uniformly to all
plants in the category.
The FWPCA required EPA to establish effluent limitations specifying, for each industrial category, the pollution abatement achievable
by the best practicable technology currently available (BPT) and the
best available technology economically achievable (BAT). 3 Industrial
dischargers were required to meet the BPT and BAT standards by
1977 and 1983, respectively, but were not required to adopt the
technologies suggested by EPA as guidelines. The actual discharge
limitation applicable to a particular plant was specified in an effluent
discharge permit. In most states, the writing of permits has been delegated to the state water quality agency. 4
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 required EPA to designate
"criteria pollutants" and to establish national ambient air quality
standards sufficient to protect the public health and welfare.' Each
state was then required to prepare and implement a state implementation plan which would achieve the ambient standards. This provision did not require the states to base their standards on particular
technologies, but most states followed this course. In addition, EPA
was directed by Congress to issue new source performance standards
by industrial category for newly constructed plants. These standards
were supposed to reflect the best performance in commercial operation at the time of promulgation, and were to be revised every few
years. 6 Unlike the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Clean
Air Act did not require sources to have permits. However, every state
implementation plan required new sources or modifications of existing sources to obtain construction permits, and in addition many required all sources to obtain periodically renewable operating permits.
3. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976) for BPT timetable. For BAT timetable, see id.
§ 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 111978).
4. One apparent exception to the technology-based standards occurred in so-called
"water quality limited" streams. If it was estimated that application of BPT and BAT would
not achieve the water quality objectives for a particular watershed, then permit writers were
able to require dischargers to meet more stringent standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
Nonetheless, the emphasis remained on what technology could do, rather than on finding
the cost-effective method of achieving the water quality objectives.
5. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § § 108-109, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 81 Stat. 1678
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 7408-7409 (Supp. 111978)). Currently the criteria pollutants are
carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur oxides, ozone, hydrocarbons, particulates, and
lead.
6. Id. § 111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. 111978)).
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THE 1977 ADJUSTMENT
Progress was made in improving air and water quality between
1972 and 1977, but the objectives of neither act were met.7 In water
policy this was neither surprising nor especially disturbing, because
the interim goal of making the water safe for contact recreation was
not supposed to be achieved until 1983. (In addition, the "fishable,
swimmable" goal of the water act did not have the same legal force
as the ambient air quality standards.) Perhaps for this reason, the
1977 Clean Water Act involved relatively minor changes to the 1972
statute. The most important of these changes was a reorientation of
best available technology toward toxic pollutants. Under the 1977
amendments, EPA is required to establish BAT standards for 65 designated toxic and "other nonconventional" pollutants for each industrial category.8 For biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), suspended
solids, and pH-the so-called "conventional pollutants"-the old best
available technology requirement was replaced by a requirement to
meet best conventional technology (BCT) standards, 9 which were intended to be somewhat more stringent than the original best practical
technology standards, but less stringent than BAT. The deadline for
meeting the new BCT standards was postponed one year to July 1,
1984, while BAT standards for toxic pollutants were to be met within
three years after promulgation, but in no case later than July 1,
1987.1 0

The primary ambient air quality standards were supposed to have
been achieved by 1977, but that year came and went with many
areas of the country-including most major metropolitan areashaving failed to achieve the standards for at least one criteria pollutant. In addition, in areas with air quality better than the standards,
maintenance of air quality was not assured. Accordingly, the 1977
Clean Air Amendments made important changes to the Clean Air Act
to address these problems of "nonattainment" and "prevention of
significant deterioration" (PSD). 1
7. "[D] ata from approximately 59 of the most polluted counties across the country
show that violations of ambient air quality standards generally either stayed constant or decreased between 1974 and 1977." COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1979). "The available evidence... suggests that water quality in
the United States, while not showing vast improvement since the early 1970s is at least not
getting any worse." Id. at 75.
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (Supp. 111978).
9. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (Supp. 111978).
10. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(F) (Supp. 11 1978).
11. 42 U.S.C. § § 7470-7491 (Supp. 11 1978). EPA had already promulgated rules covering nonattainment (41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976)) and iPSD (39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974)).
In the 1977 amendments these policies were given congressional sanction and made considerably more stringent and exacting. For a discussion of the differences between the EPA
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Additional changes included the creation of a noncompliance penalty, which was to be imposed on any source not yet in compliance
with applicable federal or state (SIP) regulations.' 2 The economic incentive for firms to delay compliance was to be eliminated by setting
the penalty equal to their cost savings from noncompliance.' ' Another section of the amendments redefined NSPS to include a "percent reduction" requirement.' I The impetus for this change was the
new source performance standards promulgated for coal-fired utility
boilers which, under the 1970 Act, could be achieved by use of lowsulfur coal without installation of sulfur dioxide control equipment.
By foreclosing such nontechnological responses to new source performance standards, the bias toward technology-based standards was
strengthened.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT AIR AND WATER
POLLUTION POLICY
As noted, 1977 brought changes intended to increase the effectiveness of the Clean Water and Clean Air acts, especially the latter. The
realization is emerging, however, that these changes may be very
costly. That possibility gives added impetus to the current discussion
of environmental policy reform. Before discussing reform, we comment briefly on the economic disadvantages of the existing approach.
One of the principal criteria for judging air and water pollution
policy is cost-effectiveness: the ability to achieve given environmental
quality goals for the lowest possible cost.' I For two reasons, technology-based standards do not perform well according to this criterion.
First, because such standards are uniform within industrial categories,
they cannot allow for the fact that the same pollutant discharged in
different locations can have vastly different environmental effects.
Second, such standards do not take adequate account of the large
differences in abatement costs among dischargers even within the
same industrial category.
Consideration of costs in establishing the various standards required by the Clean Air and Clean Water acts has almost always been
policies and the 1977 amendments, see J. Quarles, Federal Regulation of New Industrial
Plants, 10 ENVT'L RPTR. (BNA) (Monograph No. 28: May 4,1979).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7420(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 111978).
13. It was not until July 28, 1980 that final regulations were issued. See 45 Fed. Reg.
50,086 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 66-67 (1981)).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(0(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
15. Cost-effectiveness is related, but not identical, to economic efficiency. To judge the
efficiency of a policy, we must estimate the benefits attributable to the policy and compare
them to the costs. An efficient policy is cost-effective but not vice versa.
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limited to an assessment of economic impact within an industry category, i.e., whether the standards would result in plant closings or unemployment. However, results based on such impacts are imperfectly
related to cost-effectiveness: if standards must be uniform within industrial categories, the most cost-effective approach is probably to
equate marginal abatement costs across industries. 1 6 It is apparent
that EPA did not make cross-industry cost comparisons. Rough estimates of the marginal abatement costs of a sample of the best practicable technology standards promulgated under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act showed variation by a factor of 30.1 '
Although data do not exist to estimate the potential cost savings
available nationally from increased cost-effectiveness, some studies
suggest potential regional savings of over 80 percent. 1 8 Thus the cost
savings may be significant given the fact that in the coming decade
(1979-88) the average pollution abatement expenditures by manufacturing and utilities are expected to be $25 billion per year.' 9
Naturally, a policy which perfectly reflects the costs and benefits
of abatement at thousands of sources is an unattainable ideal, but
these estimates suggest that great improvements are possible, and
help explain the intense current interest in alternative approaches.
Indirect Effects
Although the direct costs of environmental regulations are significant, some analysts think that the indirect effects on the overall
economy are much more important. For one thing, the rigidities of
the technology-based approach may inhibit technological innovation
in this area, although this proposition is difficult to verify empiri16. However, if industries with high marginal abatement costs just happen to be located
where the marginal damages are high, it may be more cost-effective to set standards with
different marginal abatement costs in different industries.
17. The marginal abatement cost estimates varied from 10/kg of BOD removed for the
large chicken-processing plant subcategory to $3.15/kg BOD for the small duck-processing
plant subcategory. See A. Krupnick & W. Harrington, Equity and Efficiency in the Promulgation of Federal Regulation: The Case of EPA's Effluent Discharge Standards (Sept. 6,
1980) (paper presented at Allied Social Sciences Association Annual Meeting).
18. E.g., U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, AN ANALYSIS OF MARKET INCENTIVES TO CONTROL STATIONARY SOURCE NO x EMISSIONS (Draft Oct. 1980).
19. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT
(1980). A study prepared at Resources for the Future estimates expenditures due to implementation of the 1970 Clean Air and the Federal Water Pollution Control acts to be about
$34 billion per year in manufacturing and utilities. Total national expenditures are expected
to be $77 billion per year (1978$). See H. Peskin, Environmental Gains and Economic
Losses: A Connection? (April 1980) (report prepared for the Environmental Assessment
Council of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Philadelphia, Pa.).
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cally. ° Technology-based standards by no means eliminate the incentives for innovation. Because such standards are usually based on the
"best" technology available (variously defined), they may promote
the diffusion of existing technology. In addition, with a technologybased effluent standard, there is an incentive to introduce innovations which reduce the cost of meeting the standard so long as there
is some assurance the standard will not be tightened in response.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that technology-based standards provide little incentive for innovations that reduce emissions below stateof-the-art. In fact, these standards may discourage such innovations if
EPA always responds to them by making the standard more stringent.
This response leads to the so-called "ratchet effect,"'2 which can
affect incentives for abatement innovation at both new and existing
plants. New plants are affected because EPA is supposed to revise
new source performance standards to reflect "best available" technology. Existing plants are affected because their permits are of
limited duration. If an existing plant adopts innovative technology
that reduces pollutant discharges below the current discharge standard, it may find itself subject to a more stringent standard based on
the new technology when the permit is renewed. When standards are
ratcheted, only firms in the business of supplying abatement technology have incentives to develop pollution-reducing innovations. Because such firms typically supply end-of-pipe equipment only, opportunities for fundamental process innovations that reduce emissions
may be lost.
Technology-based standards provide barriers to other types of innovation as well. Both the Clean Air and the Clean Water acts require
new plants to meet more stringent emission limitations than existing
plants through the use of new source performance standards.2 2 This
discrepancy between old and new plant requirements tends to reduce
investment in plant and equipment, and remaining investment is diverted away from new plant construction and toward rehabilitation
of older equipment. Innovation is retarded because much of it would
be embodied in new plant investment. The tendency to "grandfather"
20. See, e.g., A. Freeman, Air and Water Pollution Policy, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 12, 56-57 (1978). If the technology-based standard requires a particular technology, there is no incentive at all for innovation. As noted, the air
and water discharge standards we are discussing required performance equivalent to a designated technology. Nonetheless, firms appear to behave as if the designated technologies are
required, an approach that minimizes their exposure to risk. Id.
21. R. Repetto, The Influence of Standards, Effluent Charges, and Other Regulatory
Approaches on Innovation in Abatement Technology (Sept. 1980) (working paper for
Center for Population Studies, Harvard University).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. 11 1978) and 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976), respectively.
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existing plants also works indirectly to inhibit innovation (and competition) by restricting entry.
Perhaps an even more serious consequence of the current approach
is that it makes for a more uncertain business climate. 2 3 Plant managers contemplating investment in new plants face uncertainty about
what future regulations will require and when the requirements will
take effect. Moreover, the extensive permitting requirements have
greatly increased the lead time required for construction of new facilities.' 4 These uncertainties can substantially affect the profitability
of new investment.
The "prevention of significant deterioration" (PSD) and nonattainment policies exacerbate the uncertainty problem. A new plant
(or an expansion of an existing plant) to be built in either a PSD or a
nonattainment area is subject to significant new regulatory requirements that may be extremely difficult to overcome. Inasmuch as investment in new plants is a primary source of economic growth, the
importance of these policies is obvious.
Under the PSD policy, the "clean air" areas of the country have
been subdivided into three classes. 2 ' In each class, a certain degradation of existing ambient air quality is permitted. These increments
are approximately 2 percent of the primary national ambient standards in Class I areas, 25 percent in Class II, and 50 percent in Class
111.2 6

In order to ensure that the increments are not violated, PSD requires a preconstruction review of proposed new or expanded industrial facilities. In this review the following are required at a minimum:
(a) monitoring of preconstruction air quality, if not previously
done;
(b) demonstration, using air quality models, that construction of
the plant will not violate any allowable increment, either around the
plant or in any other region (this could be very important for plants
located in Class II or III areas but which are upwind of Class I areas);
23. See A. Greenspan, Investment Risk: The New Dimension of Policy, 264 THE ECONOMIST 31 (Aug. 6, 1977).
24. Anecdotal evidence for the effect of environmental regulation on delay abounds.
See, for example, the case studies found in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DELAYS: SIX CASE
STUDIES (Serial No. 96-7: 1979). However, we have been unable to find any systematic
studies of the effects of regulation on construction delays.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 7472 and § 7474 (Supp. 111978).
26. Most national parks and wilderness areas were permanently designated Class I. All
other areas were initially designated Class II. States are authorized to redesignate areas to
Class I or III, but only after preparing an impact analysis and holding a public hearing. Class
III designations also require legislative approval of local governmental units representing a
majority of area residents. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(b) (Supp. I 1978).
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(c) agreement to install best available control technology (BACT);
(d) commitment to conduct postconstruction monitoring; and
(e) a public hearing.
If all requirements are satisfied, EPA will issue a permit and the
source may commence construction. 2 7
With the possible exception of (d), each of these requirements is a
potentially serious impediment to new plant construction. If previous air quality monitoring has not been adequate, it may take two
years to establish a baseline. The need to demonstrate that increments will not be violated is potentially an even greater source of
delay and uncertainty. Since air quality modeling is notoriously inexact, the stage is set for possibly lengthy litigation between opposing
groups using competing models. The confusion will be exacerbated
by the fact that the applicant will have to model not only his own
plant but the proposed plants of others.
The requirement for best available control technology will be defined case-by-case for each applicant, though the adopted technology
must be more effective than the applicable new source performance
standards. This requirement may add considerably to the cost of
abatement. Negotiation over the best available control technology
could also be a significant source of delay and uncertainty.
The effect of the public hearing requirement on uncertainty and
delay is unknown. It can be either an occasion for the establishment
of communication between the company and the community in
which it seeks to reside, or a tactical opportunity for interest groups
opposed to construction for reasons that have little to do with air
quality.
In "dirty air" areas, new or expanded plants are subject to the
nonattainment policy, 2 8 the requirements of which are likely to be
even more onerous than those of preventing significant deterioration.
In the first place, the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act required
the states to submit by July 1, 1979 revised state implementation
plans to assure compliance with ambient air quality standards by the
end of 1982 (with a possible extension of the deadline to 1987 for
photochemical oxidants and carbon monoxide). 2 9 The new state implementation plans must put into effect a permit program for construction and operation of major new or modified sources (previously
this was optional). Moreover, to obtain a permit, a firm wishing to install the new source must meet the following conditions:
27. To avoid confusion we use "source" to mean a discharge point. Thus, a plant can
have several sources just as a firm can have several plants. In EPA usage "source" can refer to
any of these entities.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. 111978).
29. Id. § 7502(a) (Supp. I 1978).
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(a) For those pollutants not meeting ambient standards, the plant
must ensure that the total quantity of emissions does not increase. 3 o
This will probably mean that pollution reductions, or "offsets,"
greater than the source is expected to generate must be obtained
from other sources of those pollutants. Alternatively, the states
could force cleanup of existing sources in order to allow a sufficient
margin for growth.
(b) The plant must install equipment that achieves a "lowest
achievable emission rate" (LAER). 3 1 Like best available control
technology, it is set on a case-by-case basis and is supposed to be
more stringent than new source performance standards.
(c) The firm must demonstrate that its other plants within the
state are in compliance.32
In addition, the state must show that it is making reasonable progress
toward achieving the 1982 (or 1987) objectives of the state implementation plan.
In principle, the offset approach can be an effective and efficient
way to achieve air quality objectives, although practical difficulties
may arise if few dischargers of the relevant pollutants can be found.3 3
However, this desirable feature may be overwhelmed by the other requirements of the nonattainment policy, which create special barriers
for expansion of existing plants or construction of new ones. Probably the greatest source of uncertainty is the requirement that the
state be making reasonable progress toward attainment. 3 1 Because
fulfillment of this requirement is vitally affected by the behavior of
air quality agencies within the state and by other firms, it is something over which the applicant has little or no control.
The prevention of significant deterioration and nonattainment
provisions together were intended to make the national air quality
program comprehensive-to bring the heavily polluted areas of the
country up to some minimum standard, while protecting the quality
of the air where it is still clean. Instead, these changes created the
potential for a regulatory quagmire. Because air quality in every location must either be better or worse than national standards, one of
these two policies will presumably apply everywhere. Moreover, because air quality in an area can be better than the ambient standard
for one pollutant and worse for another, it is possible, even probable,
that an area will be subject to both the prevention of significant
deterioration and nonattainment policies. This is not unlikely since
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 7503(1)(B) (Supp. I 1978).
Id. § 7503(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
Id. § 7503(3) (Supp. 11 1978).
See discussion regarding offsets, infra.
42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(3) (Supp. 111978).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

much of the country violates the oxidant standard while complying
with the sulfur oxide standard. Overlap can also occur if emissions
from a source located in a nonattainment area can cross into a Class I
area. In either case, the source will be subject not only to separate
requirements but even to two different air quality bureaucracies:
EPA (for prevention of significant deterioration) and the local or
state agency (for nonattainment).
In sum, the existing structure of air and water pollution regulation,
particularly the prevention of significant deterioration and nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act, is a potentially serious obstacle
to economic growth in the United States. The direct resource costs
of these policies may not be the main problem. Indeed, while the
econometric studies discussed elsewhere in this volume3 I do not
ascribe much of our current poor economic performance to environmental regulation, these models are driven only by reported or estimated direct expenditures on environmental protection. Regulatory
delay and uncertainty may be causing economic distress that these
models attribute to other causes or to the "unexplained residual."
Any discussion of reform, therefore, must consider both the expenditures necessitated by regulation and their effects on uncertainty.
PROCEDURAL REFORMS
One general approach to regulatory reform is to alter the procedures used to develop and implement environmental regulations. Such
changes can reduce both direct expenditures and the losses associated
with regulatory delay and uncertainty. Several of these proposed procedural reforms-in particular, in rulemaking and permit procedures,
delayed compliance for innovations, cost-effectiveness standards, and
improved federal-state coordination-may have clear macroeconomic
impacts.
Rulemaking Reforms
Of the myriad proposals advanced to reform the process of setting
technology-based standards, we discuss reforms of the informationgathering phase of writing effluent limitations, the use of subcategorization, and the timeliness of promulgating regulations.
Improving Information Flow
Writing any technology-based standard requires gathering and
organizing information on waste treatment practices, costs, and efflu35. See the papers by Haveman and Portney in this volume.
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ents from industry sources, control equipment vendors, and industry
experts. Typically, outside consultants, acting more or less in close
consultation with an EPA project officer, are hired to produce a "development document" or "background information" report containing this information. This process came under attack during the BPT
rulemaking because contractors, rather than EPA, initially recommended effluent limitations. Contracts were often let to the lowest
bidder regardless of credentials, and qualified contractors were accused of underbidding on initial work in order to obtain future, sole
source contracts. Finally, the range of technological alternatives considered by the contractors was too narrow.
The practice of having contractors recommend limitations has
been modified for establishment of the BAT standards in response to
3
questions about EPA's lack of oversight over the information flow. 6
But, pressures of time, funding, and custom will still limit the range
of technological alternatives considered by the contractor for best
available technology. Because many firms may be unwilling to incur
the higher risk of enforcement action associated with a compliance
strategy that departs from the suggested technology, restrictions on
the options considered may impose compliance costs that are higher
than necessary. Moreover, this problem is exacerbated for BAT because the range of pollutants, and therefore abatement options, is so
much greater than for best practicable technology.
One approach might be for EPA to fund simultaneously a number
of competitive development documents, with EPA acting as arbiter
and synthesizer. Doing so would ensure that information from many
points of view would be brought into the process at a sufficiently
early stage to affect the outcome. 3 1 Doubtless this approach would
substantially increase the cost of preparing a development document
because not one but two or three draft documents would be prepared. It would also mean more work for EPA: the agency would no
longer be able to issue the contractor's draft report as the development document without substantial changes, as it often did in earlier
rulemaking procedures. In the long run, however, the use of competitive development documents might significantly reduce the administrative cost and thereby the total social cost of a regulation. The use
of information from wider points of view may make the industry
36. Personal communication with Robert Dellinger, Project Officer, Effluent Guidelines
Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 12, 1980).
37. While information from a wide range of sources does make it into the process, most
of it enters after the regulation has been proposed. By this time the broad outlines of the
regulation usually have been set, and the regulation can be changed only slightly.
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more receptive to the regulation, reducing the chance of a court challenge, and thereby reducing administrative cost.
Greater Attention to Subcategorization
The Environmental Protection Agency issues separate regulations
for groups of firms in an industry with similar air or water problems.
This "subcategorization" of industry is required to tailor suggested
technologies and effluent limitations to specific processes, products,
or other industry characteristics. It is also used for equity reasons, to
cushion the impacts on industry segments, which otherwise would be
especially hard hit by the regulation. This practice plays a central role
in water pollution rulemaking and a more indirect role in the state
implementation planning process for air pollution control. Subcategorization can affect not only control costs for firms placed in one
category or another but also the competitiveness of the industry.
Where subcategorization is used primarily to give smaller or older
plants more lenient treatment, competition is enhanced since exit
from the industry may be prevented. Competitive industries may be
less resistant to downward pressures on prices and wages, which in
turn may make anti-inflation policy more effective. Also, more subcategories for smaller, older plants may promote efficiency if the
marginal compliance costs for these plants are higher than for larger,
newer plants at a given treatment level. However, greater subcategorization has its drawbacks. Reducing the likelihood of exit by favoring
smaller or older plants interferes with the turnover of capital stock in
the industry and thereby reduces productivity. These effects are
especially pronounced when existing plants are favored over new
plants, as is currently the case.
Because of the mixed effects of subcategorization, no simple policy option emerges. Nonetheless, explicit attention should be given
to the incentives offered to firms in the industry instead of concentrating solely on questions of equity or technology.
It should not be too surprising that greater subcategorization could
emerge as a reform. Effluent fees, marketable permits, and other traditional economic incentive policies allow environmental targets to
be reached at minimum resource cost. At the limit, if government
established subcategories so as to equalize marginal treatment costs
(a subcategory for nearly every firm might be needed), this optimal
resource allocation could be approximated. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how such a system would work in practice. For instance, small
plants do not necessarily have higher marginal costs of compliance,
while an old plant may not necessarily have all old equipment. And,
informational demands would probably be prohibitive.
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PermitReform
Permits are used extensively in both air and water pollution policy
to promote compliance with regulations. Some options which could
reduce uncertainty and delay follow.
Extend Permit Life
Increasing the life of a permit will reduce the effects of uncertainty
about future requirements because it tends to allow a more complete
amortization of existing or newly installed equipment. With a short
permit life, an operator must worry about how the requirements will
change when the permit expires, particularly in view of the ratchet
effect.
Federal water pollution permits for existing sources have a term of
five years, while for new sources the term is ten years. There is evidence that some plants are attempting to have their sources classified
as new sources, even though that designation subjects them to more
stringent effluent standards (new source standards rather than best
practicable technology) because they are willing to trade increased
certainty for the increased costs of more stringent requirements. 3 8
Improve Coordination with Other Federal and State Policies
At present, new industrial projects are subject to a wide array of
environmental statutes besides the Clean Air and Clean Water acts.3 9
The individual impact of any one of these statutes on business, much
less the cumulative effects of all of them, could be substantial. It
would be useful if the agencies administering these statutes could coordinate their efforts to ensure that this burden is no worse than necessary. Quarles suggests that one of the most difficult tasks for a
businessman-especially a small businessman-is to find out precisely
what kinds of regulations can affect him. This task becomes more
difficult as new statutes are enacted or regulations issued. As Quarles
points out,
[A] lthough substantial considerations of public policy support
the position that some system of government review should precede
industrial decisions having major impacts on public values affecting
38. J. Quarles, supra note 11, at 25.
39. Examples include the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-4374
(1976), the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § § 1531-1543 (1976), the Antiquities Act,
16 U.S.C. § § 431-433 (1976), the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § § 1451-1464,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 6901-6987 (1976), and the
Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 2601-2626 (1976). There is also a mass of legislation designed to advance other policy goals, such as worker health and safety, antitrust,
energy conservation, coal conversion, and so on.
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the environmental and natural resources, the current system of
numerous single-purpose reviews, each conducted separately and according to its own timetable, is not the best solution. Appropriate
environmental tradeoffs are difficult to make under the current
framework; unnecessary paperwork and administrative burdens are
virtually inevitable; and unduly long delays in reaching a final government decision are highly likely. 40
Several measures could be taken to help streamline the permitting
process. A regulatory clearinghouse, where a developer can find out
the permits required for particular projects, might be useful. Another
possibility would be to create an agency which would help secure the
permits. Most important, a "one-stop" permitting process could be
initiated, although this is not as simple as it might appear. The requirements of the various environmental statutes constrain the extent of possible consolidation. A one-stop process would also require
much more cooperation and communication among disparate government agencies whose goals may conflict.
The Environmental Protection Agency began the complex and difficult task of consolidating permits in 1978. Over a year ago, two
task forces were established: the New Source Review Task Force and
the EPA Permit Consolidation Task Force. Among other things, the
former recommended the designation of a new source facilitator/
expediter in each region, so that a prospective applicant could go to
one place4 1in the agency to determine the requirements it would have
to meet.
The Permit Consolidation Task Force recently issued regulations
which offer a single permit form to be used for simultaneous application and review of several EPA permits.4 2 Definitions and program
requirements have been made more uniform and a series of booklets
on the regulations addressing the concerns of particular users will be
issued.
The Environmental Protection Agency is also involved with expediting energy projects through its Energy Mobilization Task Force
and developing a more efficient format for handling the environmental impact requirements of the National Environmental Protection
Act. Thus the problem of duplicate, conflicting, and above all, cumulative permit requirements is well recognized within EPA, but numerous opportunities still exist for further consolidation of interagency
permits.
40. J. Quarles, supra note 11, at 4.
41. EPA Consolidated Permit Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 34,244 (1978).
42. In response to concern that environmental groups will find it more difficult to challenge a consolidated permit, procedures for public hearings, evidentiary hearings, and nonadversary hearings are built into the process.
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Reforms that streamline permit procedures will necessarily reduce
opportunities for environmental and other citizens' groups to delay
or alter projects. That is why the reforms will be so difficult to implement. Nevertheless, there may be some scope for shortening the
time spent negotiating without compromising substance.
Cost-effectiveness Standards
As noted earlier, technology-based standards can impose very different marginal abatement costs for different industrial categories, resulting in losses in economic efficiency unless damages vary in the
same way. One way of dealing with this problem in a regulatory
framework is to set standards which equalize marginal abatement
costs and thereby minimize the costs of obtaining the resulting reduction in aggregate emissions. There are three problems with this
approach, however. The first is the designation of the marginal cost
target, or "benchmark." There is no obvious connection between any
benchmark and the resulting levels of environmental quality. The second problem is dividing the industry so that firms with similar abatement cost functions are in the same category. The third problem is
that finding the standard corresponding to the benchmark entails
construction of detailed marginal abatement cost functions in each
industrial category. The more finely an industry is divided to obtain
homogeneity, the more work is required to construct cost functions.
A version of this policy tool surfaced in the Clean Water Act of
1977.11 To reduce the differences in marginal compliance costs of
meeting best conventional technology, Congress designated the marginal cost per unit biological oxygen demand (BOD) removed by
municipal waste treatment as a cost ceiling. Marginal costs above the
ceiling for a subcategory presumably would provide grounds for EPA
to lessen the subcategory's BCT standards. Marginal costs less than
the ceiling would mean that the compliance costs were "reasonable."
Thus Congress settled by legislative fiat the problem of setting the
benchmark-at least in theory.4 It is still too early to tell how this
process will work out in practice.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (Supp. I1 1978).
44. The initial EPA estimate of municipal marginal treatment costs of conventional pollutants was $1.15/lb. of BOD removed. The Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS)
challenged EPA's estimates and methodology while issuing a benchmark range of its own.
COWPS found marginal costs from $0.31 to $0.82 per pound of BOD removed depending
on assumptions about the proper form of the abatement cost function and correcting for
differences in plant performance variables. EPA responded that the wide variability of costs
made any benchmark open to criticism. See A. Fraas & V. Munley, Municipal Wastewater
Treatment Costs (Sept. 1980) (report to Council on Wage and Price Stability, Washington,
D.C.).
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Perhaps the greatest benefit from the implementation of costeffectiveness standards for best conventional technology will be in
setting precedents. In establishing limits for best available technology,
a convenient benchmark marginal cost is unlikely to be available for
the myriad nonconventional and toxic pollutants. But the principle
of cutting down the variance of marginal abatement costs for a given
pollutant over all affected sectors is worth serious consideration in
future rulemaking.
Innovation Waivers
In amendments to both the Clean Air and Clean Water acts, the
debilitating effects of technology-based standards on abatement innovation were recognized and legislative adjustments were introduced. In the Clean Air Act Amendments, firms experimenting with
innovative abatement methods were given additional time to comply
with the standards. However, with "innovation" never defined and
poor agency support, the program has been limping along.4" At
present, a regulation is being drawn up to grant compliance delays
for innovations under the Clean Water Act Amendments.4 6 The
statutory limit of a three-year extension is too short a period to stimulate anything but off-the-shelf technology. The inclusion, however,
of process innovations in the "innovation" definition and support for
the regulation within EPA should make it more successful than its
counterpart in the air program. Still, if the program fails to provide
additional compliance time for firms with innovative technologies
that fail, the risks of innovating may still outweigh expected gains.
SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS
The procedural reforms discussed in the previous section center on
changes in rulemaking or implementation that do not challenge the
central place of technology-based standards in water and air pollution
control policies. Certain substantive reforms, however, have begun to
supplant the technology-based approach in state implementation
plans and are on the drawing board in the water program at EPA.
There are powerful economic reasons for supporting economic incentive-based reforms over technology-based standards. Nevertheless,
45. J. Evans, Opportunities for Innovation: Administration of Section 111(j) and 113
(d)(4) of the CAA and Industry's Development of Innovative Control Technologies (Jan.
1980) (report of Performance Development Institute for U.S. Department of Commerce,
Washington).
46. See A. Krupnick & D. Yardas, An Economic Analysis of an Innovation Waiver Policy
under the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977 (Dec. 1980) (report to Office of Planning
and Evaluation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.).
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the interest in these reforms owes more to the practical problems
created by certain features of the Clean Air Act than to increased
awareness of economic principles on the part of public officials and
industry. 4 For areas in nonattainment, industrial growth has been
effectively halted unless newcomers or expanding firms can secure
emission reductions from an existing source or unless the state forces
existing firms to roll back emissions to create a "margin for growth."
In PSD areas, growth has also been limited because of requirements
on emissions from new or expanding firms. Incentive-based policies
can reduce both the roadblocks to growth and the compliance burden
on existing firms. Also, some offices in EPA view these policies as a
better means of fostering abatement innovations than through continuously redefining best available technology.
Bubbles, Banking, and Offsets
The details of these policies have been changing so rapidly that
only their general characteristics are described below. Basically, they
all involve shifting the clean-up burden toward sources with lower
abatement costs and away from those with higher abatement costs.
Thus, the aggregate compliance costs of meeting a standard can be reduced while maintaining or improving ambient quality. Firms have
incentives to find the cheapest source to control even if the control
involves a reallocation of abatement activity within the firm, an innovation, or the purchase of emission reductions from another firm.
Historically, offsets are EPA's first attempt to reduce compliance
costs through reallocating the clean-up burden. New or expanding
firms in a nonattainment area are required to install advanced treatment technology and secure emission reductions from other polluters
in the area in excess of their own emissions.4 8 The net effect of this
policy is to allow for growth in nonattainment areas, while reducing
air pollution and compliance costs. It also gives existing firms an incentive to find cheaper means of controlling their pollution. A more
recent policy innovation allows firms that reduce emissions below
their permit level to "bank" these emissions for use in their future
expansion or to sell them to a new or expanding firm as an offset.
The bubble policy that was announced in December 1979 permits
all of the stacks in a plant to be considered as one stack.4 I This pol47. In addition, Congress created the opportunity for these reforms in both the CAA
and its amendments.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. 11 1978).
49. EPA's bubble policy was affirmed in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323
(D.C. Cir. 1979). The policy is codified in 40 C.F.R. § § 51.24(b)(2) and 52.21(b)(2)
(1978).
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icy allows controls to be relaxed at those stacks where abatement
costs are high and tightened at those stacks where control is cheaper.
It is thus much like an offset transaction taking place within a firm.
Recently, the policy has been broadened so that even plants with different owners and at different locations can use the bubble policy so
long as air quality is not degraded.
Innovations that reduce emissions or costs may be stimulated
under any of these programs because emission reductions resulting
from these innovations can be sold, held for later use, or used to offset an increase in emissions elsewhere in a plant. In addition, should
these reforms reduce uncertainty and other regulatory burdens, longterm investments and associated innovation prospects may be enhanced.
Experience
The Environmental Protection Agency claims that 650 documented offsets have taken place since January 1977.s 0 Most of these
were internal offsets-where an expansion of emissions at one source
was more than compensated by a decrease in emissions from another
source owned by the same firm (e.g., closing one plant and rebuilding
another at the same site).
External offset transactions between two or more firms are not yet
common. Those external offsets that have occurred may not be typical of future offsets because they involve once-and-for-all emission
reductions, such as the substitution of water-based for oil-based
asphalt by a state highway authority.' 1
Experience with bubbles and banking is very limited. The first
bubble application was approved in November 1980, when an electric
utility proposed to substitute high for low sulfur coal at one plant
while burning natural gas instead of low sulfur coal at another plant.
Sulfur dioxide emissions should fall overall, with savings of $27 mil50. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Controlled Trading: A Generic Term (paper
distributed at EPA conference on regulatory reform, Washington, D.C., September 18-19,
1980).
51. One much publicized case involved a new General Motors plant and offsets obtained
from local oil companies in Shreveport, Louisiana, and Oklahoma City. As a result of these
transactions engineered by local Chambers of Commerce in both areas, GM built a $400
million plant employing several thousand people. However, not only were the offsets given
at no cost, so the incentive for locating the cheapest sources didn't exist, but most of the
offsets were only on paper. The oil companies were voluntarily abating pollution they would
have been required to abate two years later (under a ruling being discussed at that time).
Also, they were going to make some of the adjustments on their own for economic reasons.
See R. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING, SELLING, AND BANKING

(1980).
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lion per year. Over 40 companies are developing bubble applications,
showing savings of several million dollars each in either capital or operating costs.' 2 Banking programs have recently begun in San Francisco, Puget Sound, and Louisville, but few transactions have taken
5
place. Thirty states are formally considering the banking approach. 3
Problems
Although it is certainly too early to make solid judgments on the
viability of these programs and their macroeconomic impacts, it is
not surprising that the initial experience has been mixed. A major
problem lies in the conservatism of firm managers who may fear that
these policies will be followed in short order by others. New policies
may have contradictory requirements that leave them stuck with
valueless banked emissions and converted boilers that would need to
be reconverted. Another problem is the administrative obstacles and
high cost of obtaining bubbles and banking emissions. Only firms in
compliance may apply, and a SIP revision is required for every bubble
-a lengthy and nonroutine process.' 4
The Environmental Protection Agency is working to reduce regulatory uncertainties and simplify some administrative procedures, but
the policies still have basic problems. First, the scope for trading offsets is limited by the technology requirements on new and existing
sources. New or expanding firms must still install expensive abatement technologies. Thus, offset trading and the cost savings that go
with it involve only the relatively small amount of emissions not
treated by this technology. Existing sellers of offsets also have technology-based standards to meet.5 5 Further, firms that are likely to be
facing the largest abatement costs are those excluded from these
plans-namely, those firms not in compliance. While an equity case
can certainly be made for treating recalcitrant firms differently from
52. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Bubble Clearinghouse (EPA NewsletterDec. 1980).
53. The performance of the bank in Puget Sound cannot yet be evaluated because it is
too new, but over 90 requests for credits have been received. In San Francisco there exists
an informal bank for emission credits deposited by a firm for its future use, and a formal
bank where credits are available for sale to other firms. Participation in the informal bank
has been high because many firms which had installed more strict controls than necessary
prior to the bank's operation were "grandfathered" in. No deposits to the formal bank have
been made as yet. In Louisville, the 20 deposits resulted mainly from shut-downs. Personal
communication with Charles Bausell, economist, General Accounting Office, Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 12, 1980).
54. New rules put into effect recently by EPA, the so-called "generic" bubble policy,
waive the SIP revision rule if certain conditions are met. See Inside EPA: Weekly Report
(Dec. 5, 1980).
55. These standards are termed Reasonably Available Control Technologies (RACT).
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those cooperating with clean-up efforts, there would likely be efficiency gains if such firms were included.' 6
Another problem plaguing these policy initiatives is the high transaction costs involved in finding offset or bubble partners. Few seekers
of offsets have actually paid another firm to reduce its emissions so
that the firm could move in or expand. The SOHIO case in California
is an example of an attempted offset reportedly beset by delay and
strategic behavior on the part of suppliers of potential offsets.' '
Moreover, the volume of offsets, formal emission deposits, and multifirm bubble opportunities has not been sufficient to facilitate the development of a market. The problem is classically circular: thin markets generate little profit for middlemen, so they don't participate.
Without middlemen the market stays thin.
Among other problems, monitoring is particularly vexing. The approval of bubbles and offsets requires air diffusion modeling to prove
nondegradation of air quality under certain conditions. Much disagreement exists on the capabilities of air quality models, their consistency with one another, their appropriateness in various situations,
and so on. Until agreement is reached, the required use of such
models will add to the uncertainty surrounding these policies and restrict participation.
Turning to macroeconomic effects, well-functioning offset, bubble, and banking systems could improve the allocation of resources,
increase productivity and innovation, and reduce inflation. But a
poorly functioning offset program will tend to restrict entry of new
sources into nonattainment areas and discourage the expansion of
existing plants. Also, because most nonattainment areas contain large
cities with high unemployment, an unworkable offset program could
seriously undermine attempts to reduce the rate of unemployment.
Finally, problems in implementing these programs and in relaxing the
vast array of conditions burdening banking and bubble programs may
sour industry and regulatory authorities on other incentive approaches
to pollution control.
Marketable Pollution Permits
The marketable pollution permit (MPP) approach to controlling
pollution is an idea first advanced by Dales in 1968 as an alternative
to effluent taxes. Until recently, this idea generated little but aca56. Recalcitrant firms selling offsets would then be given credit for emission reductions
they should have made.
57. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 24, at 105-32.
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demic interest.' ' It wasn't until the application and elaboration of
the offset policy that EPA began to consider buying and selling pollution permits. Now, marketable permits are seen as the final step in a
progression that includes the bubble and banking policies discussed
earlier.
Moving to a full marketable permit system in nonattainment areas
would first involve the elimination of all technology-based emission
standards. In addition, the banking, bubble and offset policies, together with associated administrative procedures (e.g., revisions of
state implementation plans), would be combined and simplified. In
PSD areas, the lack of an offset policy means that greater institutional
changes would be required. Nonetheless, with ambient standards
tighter than the national ambient standards, a marketable permit system is perfectly compatible with prevention of significant deterioration.
Two general types of marketable permit systems can be envisioned,
one based on emission permits and another on ambient permits."s
Where ambient conditions are relatively insensitive to polluter location-chlorofluoromethane emissions may be an example-a system
where permits are defined in terms of allowable emissions may work
well. Thus, a firm in California could sell its right to emit 100 pounds
of Freon to a firm in New York without a change in the effect of the
Freon on stratospheric ozone.
Where the location of the source matters, as is the case with NO x
or particulates, the authority could issue permits allowing the source
to have some specified effect on ambient pollutant concentrations at
particular receptor points. These permits would also contain information to convert concentrations to allowable emissions. When concentration permits are traded between firms, allowable emissions would
need to be adjusted because the emissions value of a right to degrade
on the location of the buyer
air at a receptor by one unit depends
6
and seller relative to the receptor. 0
58. See J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); D. Montgomery,
Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395
(1972); T. Tietenberg, The Design of Property Rights for Air Pollution Control, 22 PUB.
POL'Y 275 (1974).
59. A. Krupnick & W. Oates, On the Design of a Market For Air Pollution Permits: The
Spatial Problem (July 1980) (paper presented at Western Economics Association Meeting,
San Diego, Calif.).
60. This information is embodied in a ratio of transfer coefficients (termed exchange
rates),

, where Tij is the contribution of a source at location i per unit of emissions to

the concentration of a pollutant at receptor j. See D. Montgomery, supra note 58, for more

on this point
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If ambient standards are to be met at all points, the ambient permit system must be complex, requiring a firm to hold a portfolio of
permits covering each receptor point. 6 1 In contrast, the emission system requires holding only one type of permit. Yet, the simplicity of
the latter system comes at the cost of uncertainty over meeting ambient standards and in a loss of efficiency. A study of the abatement
cost of meeting a hypothetical short-term NO x standard in the Chicago
area indicates that the compliance costs may be up to ten times higher
with a uniform rather than a fully spatially differentiated market permit (or effluent fee) system.6 2 For longer term standards, different
pollutants, or other locations, the cost savings may be less. In any
case, balancing the costs and benefits of greater spatial differentiation
can provide guidance about the type of system to adopt.
The theoretical advantages of marketable pollution permit systems
may be compromised by uncertainty created by two implementation
problems. 6 3 First, firms must have confidence regarding the future
behavior of the government. Unless discharge permits are treated as
property rights, entitled to the same constitutional guarantees as
other property, firms would face the uncertainty of having their permits revoked or redefined in the future. At the same time, when the
government wishes to change the quantity of rights outstanding, it
must do so in a way that minimizes market disruption. 64 Second,
firms may face market uncertainty if the number of participants is
too few. A potential buyer's fear that it will be unable to find a seller
will itself tend to prevent trading, causing firms to hold their permits
for future use rather than make them available to others. Strategic
concerns may also hinder market development, i.e., a firm may have
monopoly power and refuse to sell its permits to prevent entry or
expansion by other firms.
In view of these shortcomings, it is clear that marketable permits
will not be a panacea; the proper regulatory environment that would
make these permit markets viable will not be easily or quickly
61. Since national ambient standards must be met at all points, in theory the portfolio
would be infinitely large. In practice, receptor points in a given area could be sifted for hot
spots. Then the overall airshed would be divided into markets, each with its own hot spot.
Exchange rates would be computed from these receptor points.
62. U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY & COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,
AN ANALYSIS OF MARKET INCENTIVE TO CONTROL STATIONARY SOURCE NOx
EMISSIONS (Draft-Oct. 1980).
63. Other implementation issues concern the distribution of permits, their terms, participation by citizen groups and other third parties, verification, and enforcement. See S.
Rose-Ackerman, Market Models for Water Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25 PUB. POL'Y 383 (1977), for a discussion of implementation issues.
64. The analogy to government behavior with strategic metal or petroleum reserves is
instructive here.
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achieved. The macroeconomic effects associated with reduced compliance costs and increased innovation may therefore be slow in
coming. Present regulatory uncertainty caused by changes in technology-based stndards may only be replaced by a different kind of uncertainty-that associated with the operation of the permit markets.
Effluent Charges
No discussion of environmental policy options would be complete
without mention of effluent fees, but because this approach is already
the subject of a vast literature, we will be brief.6 ' Under an effluent
fee policy, each discharger must pay a fee or tax for each unit of pollution discharged. By forcing firms to internalize heretofore external
costs, this fee provides an incentive for pollution abatement.
In theory, effluent fees share with marketable permits two important advantages over technology-based standards. First, with either
system, an aggregate pollution discharge target can be met at least
cost. Under a uniform effluent fee, each plant would reduce its pollution discharge until the marginal cost of further abatement equaled
the fee. Most of the abating would be done by those for whom it was
least expensive. 6 6 In addition, fees offer an important long-term advantage over standards; every discharger has an incentive to search
for both pollution-reducing and cost-reducing abatement innovations.
As noted earlier, effluent standards encourage only innovations that
reduce cost.
Effluent fees also enjoy important advantages over marketable permits. Because the fee approach does not require the operation of a
market, the problems of establishing a market, of market thinness,
and of monopoly power discussed earlier are avoided. In addition, an
effluent fee avoids the rigid constraints on growth imposed by a toorestrictive permit system because the level of the fee places a ceiling
on marginal abatement costs.
Unfortunately, however, effluent fees have their own unique disadvantages. 6 7 One is the obverse of the problem mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In an expanding economy, while marketable permits risk imposing heavier than optimal abatement costs, constant
effluent fees risk deteriorating environmental quality. Second, effluent fees are emasculated through inflation.
65. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975).
66. However, environmental quality depends not only on the sum of pollution discharges, but on their spatial and temporal patterns. For this reason a nonuniform fee-one
depending on the location of the discharger-may be less costly.
67. For further discussion see Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges:A Critique, 6 CAN. J.
ECON. 512 (1973).
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A third problem of effluent fees is the disposition of the collected
revenues. The cost of an effluent charge policy to a firm includes not
only the cost of abatement but also the taxes it pays on its remaining
discharges. Unless these transfer payments are returned to industry,
the total cost of an effluent charge system to the producing sector
may be greater than under
an effluent standards policy, even though
6
the abatement cost is less. 8
Finally, it is difficult to determine what the effects of a given fee
structure on ambient environmental quality will be. Achieving an ambient quality objective with effluent fees requires fairly detailed
knowledge of the abatement cost functions of all dischargers and the
"transfer coefficients" between each discharger and the different
areas of the receiving medium. Only the latter is required for either
marketable permits or effluent standards. To remedy this problem,
some writers have suggested a trial-and-error approach or a "selfadjusting" charge. In either case, the fee would initially be set at a low
level and would increase annually until the desired ambient conditions were met. This approach might work with a uniform charge,
but if the fee is spatially differentiated and some areas exceed the
ambient objective and other areas fail to meet it, it would be virtually
impossible to know how to adjust the fee structure. This problem
would be especially difficult in an area undergoing rapid economic
growth.
CONCLUSION
The high costs and limited success of the air and water pollution
policies formulated in the early 1970s have given impetus to a search
for reform. Most of the suggested reforms discussed above have been
promoted either to remove procedural obstacles to plant expansion
or to replace the current command-and-control approach to regulation with economic incentives. Their proponents see these reforms as
the means to a considerable reduction in the cost of environmental
policy, with little, if any, sacrifice in environmental quality. At the
same time, many of these ideas will be strenuously opposed by environmentalists, who generally fear that any change in the status quo
will represent a retreat in the nation's commitment to environmental
quality.
The effects of these reforms may not be nearly as disastrous as op68. E. Brill, C. Revelle & J. Liebman, An Effluent Charge Schedule: Cost, FinancialBurden and Punitive Effects, 15 WATER RES. RESEARCH 993 (1979). Transfer payments
would need to be returned to industry in such a way that incentives to abate are left undisturbed.
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ponents fear. There is little in them that is inherently hostile to environmental quality. Indeed, if these policy instruments can achieve
given levels of environmental quality at lower economic cost, the tension that certainly now exists between the goals of environmental
quality and economic growth will be reduced. In other words, costeffective policy instruments are also environmentally benign.
However, the expectations of the benefit to be derived from any
of the alternatives need to be tempered. Some of the difficulties of
the current approach are not corrected by any of the reforms discussed here, and may well be inevitable regardless of policy. One of
these is the need for source surveillance. Accurate information about
what sources are actually discharging is necessary to determine
whether effluent standards or permit conditions are being complied
with, and to calculate each plant's effluent charge payment. However,
surveillance is expensive and for this reason has hitherto been infrequent. Therefore, we do not really know the extent to which existing
permits or standards are being violated, although some empirical
work suggests that it is substantial. 6 9
Another difficulty with current policy that is not easily handled by
the reforms we have discussed is the spatial problem. Every imaginable pollution control policy works immeasurably better for those
pollution problems which are not location-specific. Unfortunately,
few problems fall into this category.
A third element common to all policies is the importance of politics. Attempts to remove political considerations from environmental
policy-making have been prominent ever since environmental concerns first arose. For example, the desire to put environmental concerns above politics probably contributed to Congress' initial embrace
of the technology-based approach; it was hoped that these standards
could be based purely on technical decisions made by disinterested
experts at EPA. We know now that enough ambiguity was written
into the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
to allow extensive room for negotiation between EPA and affected
industries, as well as plenty of opportunities to apply political pressure. These opportunities will almost surely be just as important for
any other policy instrument." Environmental decisions are political,
of course, because alternative policies or programs have different dis69. W. Harrington, THE REGULATORY APPROACH TO AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF NEW MEXICO (1981).
70. C. Russell, What Can We Get From Effluent Charges, 5 POL'Y ANALYSIS 155
(1979), argues that an effluent charge system will be subject to the same political influences
as the current regulatory approach.
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tributional consequences. What we rather disparagingly call "politics"
is really the process by which various parties exercise their rights to
be heard and to petition for a redress of grievances. Choice of policy
instrument will not affect this fact, inconvenient though it may be.
Finally, much of the uncertainty that is said to dampen the entrepreneurial spirit may be an inevitable consequence of environmental
policy. One reason environmental regulation imposes so much uncertainty on the economy is that so little is known about the health and
ecological effects of pollution, especially trace amounts of toxic
materials. Removing regulatory barriers to economic growth does not
eliminate this uncertainty; rather it shifts the burden of risk to the
environment.
We insert these notes of caution, not because we think that environmental policy reform is hopeless. On the contrary, the alternatives
discussed here, especially those involving economic incentives, offer
much promise. However, nothing would destroy that promise with
greater sureness than a backlash caused by unfulfilled expectations.

